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UNITED STATES '' . ' J _ / ~ert to CA3 (Gibbons, 
4~~ Higginbotham; Garth, 
v. 1-pyf ''~¥1):;:;~9 ) FTC 4 -__:::-
sHEARER (mother of J,... 
deceased serviceman) 
1
e1c . Federal/Civil Timely 
~~--4 9. cjd-1--Hu ~ ~ 
~~- v 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that both the Feres doctrine and 
the intentional tort exception bar recovery under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act by a mother whose son was murdered by a fellow 
serviceman. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: While off-base on authorized 
~ I a~o.. o. . 1.-11/e /6'7 certz.;"-~"' --/4. "'e"'~"'r;~  ~~[j,"'j 
is f<il'fM\, U ~ '';"l..;;i-~ '• Lw!L, <JJ-,~ ~ .;,.,~. 
~~ i~(l<')~ q~tffM61. -~ 
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leave, resp's son, Private Shearer, was ki~napped and murdered by 
a fellow serviceman, one Heard, who was subsequently convicted of 
the murder in New Mexico state court. Three years earlier, while 
stationed in Germany, Heard had been convicted of the allegedly 
gruesome murder of a German woman, for which he served~e years 
-1 
of a four-year sentence. Heard had returned to the United States 
upon his release from the German jail just four months before he 
killed Shearer. At the time of the murder, the Army had initiated 
proceedings to discharge him, as at least three of his superiors 
had recommended. 
Resp brought this action seeking damages against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 u.s.c. §1346(b), 2671 
et ~· She~aimed that the Army was responsible for Shearer's 
death because of its negligent failure to control Heard, to 
prevent him from endangering others, to warn others that he was at 
large, and to remove him from active duty, all despite its 
knowledge of his dangerous and murderous propensities. 
The DC 
judgment on 
(Hannum, E. D. Pa.) granted the government summary 
....,/' 
the ground that the doctrine of Fe res v. United 
States, 340 u.s. 135 (1950), barred the suit. The court reasoned ..., 
that while the injury had not occurred during activity incident to 
military service, the allegedly negligent conduct related 
"directly to decisions of military personnel made in the course of 
the performance of their military duty." The court did not 
V" 
address the government's contention that the intentional tort 
( exception to the FTCA also precluded suit • . 
A divided panel of CA3 reversed. Because the crucial 
- 3 -
~ question under Feres is whether the serviceman sustained the 
injury in the course of or incident to his military service, the 
( 
court found that generally an off-duty seviceman who is off-base 
and not engaged d n military activity at the time of the injury may 
recover under FTCA. The court relied on Brooks v. United States, 
337 u.s. 49 (1949), in which this Court allowed an off-duty 
serviceman hit by a military vehicle while engaged in personal 
, d (.'It '1 , , , d h C I bus1ness to recover un er the FTCA. It cr1t1c1ze t e D s 
"singular focus on the status and activity of the allegedly 
negligent parties ••• without considering the status and activity 
of the injured party. 11 The court also ~jected as erroneous the 
DC 1 s reliance on two cases, including Henning v. United States, 
4 46 F. 2d 7 7 4 (CA3 1971) , in which the Fe res doctrine had bar red 
recovery by servicemen alleging medical malpractice in an army 
hospital. According to CA3, they had not utilized a "tortfeasor 
status-activity analysis," but rather recognized that malpractice 
by military physicians was incident to military service. By 
contrast, the court observed, "certainly being kidnapped off base 
at gun point can never be perceived as one of the activities or 
anticipated free benefits of being in the armed services." 
V CA3 also found no bar in the intentional tort exception, 
~
which precludes recovery on "[a]ny claim arising out of assault 
[and] battery II 28 u.s.c. §2680 (h). The court found that 
FTCA does not bar recovery for injury caused by an assault and 
battery so long as the intentional tort "ha[s) its roots in 
( government negligence." Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 
1395-97 (CA3 1972). It relied heavily on Gibson, in which the 
- 4 -
( court had allowed a Job Corps instructor to recover for injuries 
sustained when one of his trainees, a juvenile delinquent and 
( 
narcotics addict, attacked the instructor with a screwdriver 
during a class. The Gibson court held the attack "a foreseeable 
consequence of the government's failure to exercise due care." 
CA3 below also distinguished several cases in which courts had 
rejected attempts to sue government superiors for negligent 
supervision of employees who had intentionally injured the 
plaintiffs or their decedents, including Hughes v. Sullivan, 514 
F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom., Hughes v. United States, 
662 F.2d 219 (CA4 1981) 1 Naisbitt v.· United States, 611 F.2d 1350 
(CAlO 1980) 1 and United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d 294 (CAS 
1965). The court stated that in each the alleged negligence had 
been but a remote cause of injury or the plaintiffs had, "through 
"- artful pleadings with conclusionary allegations, attempt[ed] to 
( 
create a negligence issue." 
vjudge Garth dissented. He expressed his disagreement' with 
the majority's Feres holding, noting that the CA3's own decision 
in Henning taught that an allegation of negligence required an 
inquiry into the time and place of the negligence. But he 
primarily addressed the~ntentional tort exception, adopting the 
reasoning of Collins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 
1966) (emphasis in original): 
Congress could easily have excepted claims for assault. 
It did not1 it used the broader languag~exfie~~fig 
claims arising out of assault. It is plain t at e 
claim arose only because of the assault and battery, and 
equally plain that it is a claim arising out of the 
assault and battery. 
The dissent would have found Naisbitt, Hughes, and Shively 
( 
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controlling. In Naisbitt, two off-duty members of the Air Force 
entered a privately owned store and assaulted, raped, and murdered 
several persons. Plaintiffs founded their cause of action on the 
negligent failure of the United States to supervise and restrain 
the airmen. CAlO affirmed the district court's dismissal of the 
suit after finding that it arose from assaults and batteries. In 
Hughes, a mailman on his route lured two young girls into his 
truck and took indecent sexual liberties with them. Their mother 
brought suit, contending that postal authorities had acted 
negligently in failing to relieve the mailman of his duties after 
a virtually identical incident some years before. CA4 affirmed 
the district court's dismissal of the suit on the ground that it 
arose from assaults and batteries. In Shively, an officer 
negligently issued a pistol to one Sergeant Lancaster, who was 
off-duty and in civilian clothes. Lancaster used the pistol to 
shoot his recently divorced wife and kill himself. CAS held that 
the ex-wife's claim arose out of assault and was thus barred. 
~udge Garth distinguished Gibson on the ground that the court 
there had found that by placing a group of trainees with drug and 
behavioral problems in a controlled, rehabilitative environment, 
the government had accepted a duty to care for them, control them, 
and prevent them from harming others. Here, by contrast, the 
government had never accepted any special obligation to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent Heard from harming Shearer or anyone. 
CA3 voted six to four to deny the petition for rehearing en 
( bane, Judges Garth, Adams, Hunter, and We is voting to grant. 
Judge Garth reiterated his disagreement with the panel 
( 
disposition, emphasizing that the panel had relied on a case, 
Shively, which had come to a directly contrary result. Judge 9 
Adams also issued a statement, arguing that the conflict between 
the panel's decision and those of other circuits on the 
\----··~-·------·-------
intentional tort exception, as well as the importance of the 
~~
panel's decision on the Feres doctrine, counselled en bane 
consideration. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that CA3's holding conflicts 
with those of every other court of appeals to decide the issue, 
including CAlO in Naismith, recently reaffirmed in Wine v. United 
States, 70S F.2d 366 (CAlO 1983), CA4 in Hughes, and CAS in 
Shively. CA3's attempted distinction of these cases cannot stand, 
as Naismith, Wine, and Hughes terminated with dismissals, and 
Shively reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, CAS expressly 
noting its agreement that the government was negligent. Moreover, 
the decision below is inconsistent with the "arising out of" 
language of the statute, the plain meaning of which would bar this 
suit. Further, since Congress indisputably intended section 
2680(h) to exempt the government from liability for the 
intentional torts of its employees acting within the scope of 
their duties, it could not possibly have intended to allow 
recovery for intentional torts by employees acting outside the 
scope of their duties and thus even further beyond the 
government's supervision and control. Indeed, CA3's decision 
imposes on the government a novel form of liability unknown at 
( common law, which does not recognize a duty on the part of the 
employer to exercise reasonable care to prevent its employees from 
I 
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~ doing harm to others even when the employer knows of its 
employee's dangerous inclinations and has the ability to control 
the employee's off-duty activities. This is particularly 
inappropriate in light of the purpose of the intentional tort 
( 
( 
exception to exempt the government even from some well-established 
forms of liability. 
The Feres holding was also error. This Court has explained 
that the doctrine emanates from the relationship of serviceman to 
military superior and is concerned to avoid judicial second-
guessing of decisions necessarily entrusted to military 
discretion. The alleged negligence arises directly from basic 
decisions about the discipline, control, and discharge of Heard~ 
CA3 has therefore undermined the basis of the Feres doctrine. The 
location of the murder and the off-duty status of the victim make 
no difference, because they do not af feet the source of the 
alleged negligence. Brooks is inapposite. Because the duty 
breached by the driver there was one owed to plaintiff not as 
serviceman but as member of the public at large, the suit entailed 
no review of military decisions. 
4. ·DISCUSSION: This seems a grant. CA's reasoning is 
unpersuasive on both counts. The conflict on the scope of the 
intentional tort exception is genuine, and the dissent's 
distinction of Gibson is considerably more coherent than the 
majority's distinction of Naisbitt, Hughes, and Shively. CA3's 
focus on off-duty status and off-base location undermines Feres, a 
course this Court has shown little inclination to endorse. 
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t<1ay 13, 1985 
84-194 United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief: 
Please add at the end of the next draft of your 
opinion that I took no part tn the consideration or decision 
of this case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~ltp'ftm.t Qioud a£ t4t ~nittb ~talt.e' 
Jla#lfUtgton, ~. Qi. 2ll~'l~ 
May 13, 1985 
No. 84-194 United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.fu.prtutt Qfltltrl af tlft ~tb .ftaUB 
-ufringhm. ~. <If. 2llp'!~ 
Re: No. 84-194 United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
May 14, 1985 
Sincerel~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
,JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~tt;trnnt Qlonrl of tift Jmttb ~tauS' 
Jlag~ ~. Ql. 211~"'' 
May 15, 1985 
f 
84-194 - United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
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CHAMeERS OF" 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.-upumt Qf1tttrl 1tf tlft ~ttb jltatts 
,.-u4ln!lhtn, ~. <If. 211~~~ 
May 15, 1985 
Re: 84-194 - United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief: 
It seems to me that your discussion of Feres in 
Part II-B of your opinion is sufficient to support 
the disposition, and therefore that the discussion in 
Part II-A is not necessary. If there is any 
possibility that you could omit Part II-A, I would be 
happy to join your opinion. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OP' 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
May 16, 1985 
No. 84-194 
United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief, 
I agree with John that the decision 
in this case should turn on Ferres 
without addressing the Federal Tort 
Claims Act question. Like him, if you 
could omit Part II-A, I too would be 
happy to join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!SERS 01' 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tm:t <!fonri ~ tlf~ b .Shdte 
Jraelfbtgt4tlt. Jl. <¢. 21l.?"# ' 
Re: No. 84-194, United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief: 
May 17, 1985 
On reflection, I am persuaded that the proper approach 
to the resolution of this case is on the Feres doctrine, 
rather than on §2680(h). Thus, like John and Bill Brennan, 
I could go along, perferably, only with Parts I and IIB of 
your opinion. I think I see problems down the road with 
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.JUSTICE: w .. . .J. l!IRE:NNAN, .JR. 
~ant Q}4tJtrt 4tf tift ~Zt »tatt• 
.... ~ JJ. ~ 21l~"' 
June 24, 1985 
No. 84-194 
United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief, 
I attach a brief statement that 
I'll file in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Attachment 
No. 84-194 -- United States v. Shearer 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
I do not join Part II-A of the Court's opinion. I do, 
however, join Part II-B and therefore concur in the judgment • 
• 
CHAMI!IERS 01" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.h}rt-mtt ~..uri 4lf tltt ~ttittb ~tatt· 
.. a.Jrittgt~ ~. ~· 211~,., ' 
Re: No. 84-194, United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief: 
June 24, 1985 
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cc: The Conference 
Ct-IAME!IERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.ilupunu Q11tttti 1tf tlrt ~mub .§taUs 
'cJilulfhtghtn. ~. cq. 2llp~' 
June 25, 1985 
Re: 84-194 - United States v . Shearer 
Dear Bill: 
Would you please join me in your separate 
statement. I will withdraw mine so that we don't 
have too many one-liners. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~tutt Q}onrt d tltt ~b jJtatts 
,..uJri:ngton. ~. a}. 2ll~'l# 
Re: No. 84-194, United States v. Shearer 
Dear Bill: 
June 25, 1985 
would you please add my name to your brief statement 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 01" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.iltpr.tm.t <!fouri &tf tlft J{nittb- .ibttts 
,.-ulfi:ttghm~ J. <!J. 2ll.?,.# 
Re: No. 84-194, United States v. Shearer 
Dear Chief: 
June 25, 1985 
Inasmuch as Bill Brennan and Thurgood are filing 
separate statements, it is perhaps easier if I join Bill 
Brennan rather than to have you note me separately at the 
beginning of your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
jldJ.. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
84-194 United States v. Shearer (Lynda) 
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